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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken from a final order of the Second District Court. 
1; 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0), § 78-2-2(4), and § 78-2a-3(2)G). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
agreements, executed at different times and containing fundamentally 
inconsistent terms and provisions, was in error or whether the agreements 
cai 1 soi i lehc • v>> ' be hai i i ionized and enfoi ced coi lsistei it nth 1:1 le disti ict 
court's reasoning. (R. at 1660-95, 1871-78). 
"Questions of contract interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic 
evidence ai e n latter s of lai, < , an I c n si ich ;:ji lestioi is w e accoi d the ti ial 
couifs interpretation no presumption of correctness." Sackler v. Savin, 897 
P.2d 121 / , 1 220 (I Jti il i 1/995) '' We review [a] district comi > .iu IM-H to 
gran1 ••••:• : . ) : . . . : ' • • , .•!••-.••.-.. riiunpi;- : • j< »-. .u : 
district court. Swan Creek Village Homeowners v. Warne, 134 P.3d 1122, 
1 , l u l l < iH>) 
2. ' ' Whether the disti i ::t :: : i n It ii t iproperl> grai ited si n i u nary ji idgi nent 
deeming the contested release agreements unambiguous but then looking 
1 
beyond the four corners and the plain language of the agreements in 
endeavoring to establish an intent inconsistent with that expressed therein. 
(R. at 16324654, 1871-1878). 
Questions of contract interpretation are reviewed for correctness 
with no deference accorded to the trial court. Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 
1217, 1220 (Utah 1995). "We review the district court's entry of summary 
judgment for correctness. We recognize that "[sjummary judgment is 
appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Wilcox v. 
Anchor Wate Co., P.3d (Utah 2006). 
"If, however, the meaning of a contract must be determined by the 
consideration of extrinsic evidence, that raises a question of fact for the trier 
of fact that will preclude summary judgment." Interwest Construction v. 
Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah 1996).l 
3. Whether the district court erred in ruling that a secret indemnity 
agreement executed between the Defendants can be invoked as a shield to 
abrogate Plaintiffs claims on the basis that the effect of the undisclosed 
1
 Reference to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties' intent creates "a 
question of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact, therefore precluding [a] 
grant of summary judgment." WebBank v. American General Annuity 
Service Corp., 54 P.3d 1139, 1142 (Utah 2002). 
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accord would ostensibly result in an impermissible circuity of action. (R. at 
1632-1654,1660-1695,1871-1878). 
Questions of contract interpretation are reviewed for correctness 
with no deference accorded to the trial court. Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 
1217, 1220 (Utah 1995). "We review [a] district court's decision to grant 
summary judgment for correctness, granting no deference to the district 
court." Swan Creek Village Homeowners v. Warne, 134 P.3d 1122, 
1126 (Utah 2006). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Since the primary issues raised on appeal all concern the force and 
effect of certain contractual provisions interpreted by the district court, 
there are no explicitly dispositive statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations. 
Nevertheless, the following case law would inform the Court's adjudication 
of this matter: 
"Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of 
material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law, we 
accord no deference to the trial court's resolution of the legal issues 
presented. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts 
3 
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party." Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 48 P.3d 918, 924 (Utah 
2002)(internal citation omitted). 
"[SJummary judgment may not be granted if.. . an ambiguity exists 
in the contract and there is a factual issue as to what the parties intended." 
Id. "When a contract is clear on its face, extraneous or parol evidence is 
generally not admissible to explain the intent of the contract." Faulkner v. 
Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983). "When ambiguity does 
exist, the intent of the parties is a question of fact to be determined by the 
jury." Plateau Min. Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 
720, 725 (Utah 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case arises from a serious incident of medical malpractice that 
occurred on July 18, 2000, at McKay-Dee Hospital, leaving the patient, 
Terry F. Ward, mentally impaired and permanently disabled. 
Prior to filing a complaint Terry Ward's wife, Plaintiff Vickie Lynn 
Ward, agreed to a settlement with the anesthesiologist who participated in 
her husband's operation, John Luckwitz, MD, an employee of Third Party 
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Defendant Mountain West Anesthesia, LLC (hereinafter "Mountain West"). 
In connection with this settlement, Mrs. Ward executed a release agreement 
on March 16, 2001. A second release containing different provisions and 
expressly purporting to supersede the first release was subsequently 
executed on March 29, 2001. 
Mrs. Ward then brought an action against Defendant McKay-Dee 
Hospital (hereinafter "McKay-Dee") under a theory of ostensible agency. 
Mrs. Ward asserted that the hospital is vicariously liable for the negligence 
that resulted in Mr. Ward's catastrophic injuries since McKay-Dee both 
selected and procured the anesthesia services for the ill-fated procedure. 
McKay-Dee and Mountain West sought and obtained summary judgment 
relying on certain provisions taken from the first of those two different 
March 2001 release agreements. 
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor 
of Defendants McKay-Dee and Mountain West. The disposition of this 
appeal turns on the current legal effect of the two separate releases. 
Relevant Facts 
1. On or about July 18, 2000, Terry F. Ward was admitted to McKay-
Dee Hospital for routine hernia repair surgery. (R. at 580, 743). 
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2. The operation was performed by Dr. Steven J. Carabine. (R. at 743). 
3. Dr. Carabine was assisted during the procedure by anesthesiologist 
Dr. John Luckwitz. (R. at 743). 
4. Terry Ward never met Dr. Luckwitz until just moments before the 
surgery. (R. at 575, 583). 
5. Dr. Luckwitz was selected and/or assigned to participate in the 
surgery by McKay-Dee Hospital. (R. at 573-575, 579, 597). 
6. As an anesthesiologist working at McKay-Dee Hospital, Dr. 
Luckwitz customarily received assignments from the Hospital specifying 
which surgeries he would participate in on any given day. (R. at 574, 579, 
597-598). 
7. Prior to Terry Ward's surgery, Mr. Ward was considered to be "a 
very healthy gentleman without underlying medical conditions." (R. at 
575). 
8. During Terry Ward's surgery, severe complications arose resulting 
in, among other things, cardiac arrest and permanent brain injury. (R. at 
581,758). 
9. Claims arising from Dr. Luckwitz's participation in the surgery were 
subsequently settled, and a final Release and Settlement Agreement 
6 
memorializing the same was executed on March 29, 2001. (R. at 1683-
1695). 
10. The final Release and Settlement Agreement ("Final Agreement") 
was executed by Vickie L. Ward, as Permanent Guardian and Conservator 
of the Estate of Terry F. Ward, and by Scottsdale Insurance Company, as 
agent for Dr. John Luckwitz and Mountain West Anesthesia. (R. at 1683-
84, 1695). 
11. Under the terms of the Final Agreement, all claims against McKay-
Dee Hospital were expressly reserved. (R. at 1685). 
12. The Final Agreement includes a complete integration clause 
explicitly affirming that there are no other valid or binding arrangements or 
agreements of any kind between any of the parties: 
This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the 
Claimant, the Insured, and the Insurance Company . . . There 
are no other understandings or agreements, verbal or 
otherwise . . . between the Parties. 
(R. at 1692) (emphasis added). 
13. The Final Agreement additionally provides: 
The Parties . . . warrant and represent that no promise, 
inducement or agreement not expressed in this Agreement 
has been made to them and that this Agreement constitutes 
the entire agreement between the Parties and that the terms 
of this Agreement are contractual and not mere recitals. 
7 
(R. at 1693) (emphasis added). 
14. A preliminary settlement document entitled "Settlement Agreement 
and General Release" ("preliminary agreement") was executed on March 
16, 2001, two weeks before the Final Agreement. (R. at 1681). 
15. The preliminary agreement contained a boilerplate indemnification 
clause not incorporated into the Final Agreement. (R. at 1678-1681, 1683-
1695). 
16. Plaintiff has maintained that pursuant to the express terms of the 
Final Agreement, the preliminary agreement was superseded and is of no 
legal effect. (R. at 1660-1675). 
17. Notwithstanding the disputed validity of the preliminary agreement, 
like the Final Agreement, it likewise articulates the parties' unequivocal 
intent of preserving Plaintiffs' claims against McKay-Dee Hospital: 
Nothing in this Release shall be construed as releasing 
Ward's claims against. . . McKay Dee Hospital, and/or its 
employees. 
(R. at 1678) (emphasis added). 
18. McKay-Dee Hospital is not a party to either the Final Agreement or 
the preliminary agreement, and nothing in either document suggests that 
McKay-Dee Hospital was an express or intended third-party beneficiary, or 
8 
had any standing to invoke or enforce the same. (R. at 1678-1681, 1683-
1695). 
19. At the time the preliminary agreement and the Final Agreement were 
negotiated and executed, Mountain West had a separate secret contractual 
arrangement with McKay-Dee Hospital in place that included certain 
indemnification provisions that Mountain West failed to disclose to 
Plaintiff. (R. at 1455-1476). 
20. In February 2004, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint asserting, 
among other things, a claim against McKay-Dee Hospital under a theory of 
ostensible agency, claiming that McKay-Dee was vicariously liable for the 
acts and omissions of Dr. Luckwitz. (R. at 759-760). 
21. Several years after the action below was brought, both Mountain 
West and McKay-Dee later invoked the secret indemnification agreement 
that they had amongst themselves to argue that Plaintiff could not pursue an 
ostensible agency claim against McKay-Dee Hospital claiming it would 
result in a so-called "circuity of action." (R. at 1404-1416, 1479-1485, 
1501-1519, 1877). 
22. On November 13, 2006, the trial court heard oral argument on a 
summary judgment motion filed by Mountain West and joined by McKay-
9 
Dee Hospital, which posited, among other things, that the preliminary 
agreement remained enforceable and could be harmonized with the Final 
Agreement which explicitly purported to superseded it, and that the secret 
indemnity agreement between Mountain West and McKay-Dee Hospital 
could be invoked to create a circuity of action precluding Plaintiffs claims 
notwithstanding their failure to inform Plaintiff of the agreement at the time 
the Final Agreement was negotiated. (R. at 1871-1878). 
23. The trial court subsequently entered an order granting summary 
judgment. (R. at 1886-1889). 
24. Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal seeking review of the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment. (R. at 1890-1892). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment motion is premised on a 
disputed indemnification clause found in the preliminary agreement but not 
incorporated into the Final Agreement. Plaintiff contends that pursuant to 
several separate merger and integration clauses contained in the Final 
Agreement, the entire preliminary agreement was superseded and rendered 
invalid. 
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Plaintiff argues that since the trial court found no ambiguity in the 
terms of the final agreement, it had a duty to ascertain and to enforce the 
parties' intent consistent with the plain language thereof. By ignoring and 
giving no effect to the multiple merger and integration mechanisms, 
however, the trial court failed to do that. Additionally, the trial court 
entertained and relied on extrinsic evidence to arrive at an outcome 
inconsistent with these same contractual provisions by purporting to 
"harmonize" the Final Agreement with the preliminary agreement to 
preserve the disputed indemnification provision. 
Plaintiff alternatively argues that if both the Final Agreement and the 
preliminary agreement remain valid notwithstanding the multiple 
integration clauses, and if extrinsic evidence is to be freely considered in 
determining their underlying intent, then it is clear that one of the central 
components of the settlement was to preserve, to the fullest extent, 
Plaintiffs claims against McKay-Dee Hospital. The settlement between 
Plaintiff and Mountain West was not to be interpreted or applied in any 
way that would impede those claims. 
Mountain West, however, subsequently came forward endeavoring 
to impede Plaintiffs claims against McKay-Dee by claiming that if 
11 
Plaintiff recovers from McKay-Dee, Mountain West may in turn have to 
indemnify McKay-Dee on the basis of an alleged arrangement that McKay-
Dee and Mountain West have with each other. Mountain West failed to 
disclose its arrangement vis-a-vis McKay-Dee to Plaintiff during 
settlement, but now wants to employ the terms of that agreement, in concert 
with the separate terms of the preliminary settlement with Plaintiff to 
prevent Plaintiff from pursuing her separate claims against McKay-Dee lest 
Mountain West incur some liability to McKay-Dee. 
Finally, Plaintiff contends that the concept of "circular litigation" 
relied upon by the trial court in this case is erroneous because it essentially 
requires a prospective adjudication of circumstances and claims that may or 
may not actually ripen into an actual conflict. Additionally, in the case at 
issue, the trial court simply assumes the existence and validity of an 
ostensible indemnification arrangement between Mountain West and 
McKay-Dee, but fails to make any explicit findings on the record that it 
ever actually reviewed such a document and could legitimately conclude as 
a matter of law that it is enforceable and that no viable defenses to its 
application in this context exist. There was no argument and no briefing 
regarding this side agreement and its validity or applicability. 
12 
Summary judgment was inappropriately granted for all of these 
reasons. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT PREMISED ON AN INCORRECT 
DETERMINATION OF THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE 
PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT VIS-A-VIS THE FINAL 
AGREEMENT, 
Paramount to this Court's review is a determination of the legal 
effect of the preliminary agreement which provides the critical 
underpinning of the trial court's summary judgment ruling. The 
preliminary agreement contains a disputed indemnification clause not 
incorporated into the parties' Final Agreement, upon which the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment motion was premised. 
If this Court agrees with Plaintiff that the entire preliminary 
agreement has been integrated and superseded by the Final Agreement, the 
Court need not proceed to determine the particular scope and effect of the 
contested indemnification clause, and attempt to divine the parties' 
understandings and intentions with respect to the same. 
"The lower court's interpretation of a contract presents a question of 
law, which we review for correctness. We also review for correctness the 
13 
trial court's grant of summary judgment and afford no deference to its legal 
conclusions." Tom Heal Commercial Real Estate, Inc. v. Overton, 116 
P.3d 965, 967 (Utah App. 2005). 
"When reviewing a trial court's grant of a motion for summary 
judgment, this court. . . considers all evidence and reasonable inferences 
derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party below." 
Bear River Mutual Ins. Co. v. Williams, 153 P.3d 798 (Utah App. 2006). 
A. The preliminary agreement was explicitly superseded by the 
express terms of the Final Agreement 
"A basic tenet of contract law is that prior negotiations and 
agreements merge into the final written agreement on the subject." Panos 
v. Olsen and Associates Const., Inc., 123 P.3d 816, 819 (Utah App. 2005) 
(citations omitted). "Importantly, courts apply a presumption that a writing 
which on its face appears to be an integrated agreement is what it appears to 
be." The Cantamar, L.L.C v. Champagne, 142 P.3d 140, 147 (Utah App. 
2006). 
"If contract terms are clear and unambiguous, we normally interpret 
them according to their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to 
extrinsic evidence." Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 629 (Utah App. 1993) 
(citations omitted). 
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In the present matter, the language incorporated by the parties in 
their Final Agreement makes apparent that they intended it to be a final and 
fully integrated expression of the settlement reached: 
The Parties . . . warrant and represent that no promise, 
inducement, or agreement not expressed in this Agreement 
has been made to them and that this Agreement constitutes 
the entire agreement between the Parties and that the terms of 
this Agreement are contractual and not mere recitals. 
(R. at 1693). 
This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the 
Claimant, the Insured, and the Insurance Company with 
regard to the matters set forth in it. There are no other 
understandings or agreements, verbal or otherwise, in relation 
to the Agreement, between the parties except as expressly set 
forth in it. 
(R. at 1692). 
The viability of Mountain West's summary judgment motion, 
however, was entirely contingent upon the application of a boilerplate 
indemnification provision recited in the preliminary agreement but 
excluded in the Final Agreement. (R. at 1871-1877). In granting summary 
judgment then, the district court completely ignored the two express and 
separate merger/integration clauses found in the Final Agreement. Instead, 
the district court purported to "harmonize" the preliminary agreement with 
the Final Agreement, rather than simply interpreting the merger/integration 
15 
clauses in accordance with their plain, unambiguous terms. (R. at 1871-
1877) 
In essence, the district court's ruling suggests that while the Final 
Agreement expressly disclaims all other "promises, inducements, or 
agreements," and establishes itself as the, "entire agreement between the 
Claimant, the Insured, and the Insurance Company," there really are, in 
fact, ancillary agreements, and the Final Agreement is not the conclusive 
integrated agreement that it purports to be. Id The district court, for 
instance, erroneously suggests that the agreements can be "harmonized" 
and that the multiple integration/merger clauses of the Final Agreement do 
not supersede the indemnification clause of the preliminary agreement 
because the Final Agreement does not specifically and separately disclaim 
the indemnification clause. Id. There is no legitimate authority for such a 
proposition, and this Court should not uphold a standard whereby every 
provision of a preliminary arrangement not ultimately incorporated into a 
final arrangement is presumed to remain in force despite an express 
integration clause unless the final agreement specifically addresses and 
invalidates each such preliminary provision separately. 
16 
Even the case law cited by the district court fails to support this 
misguided notion. For example, the district court looks to Acequia, Inc. v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of America 226 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2000), to support the 
proposition that an original contract remains in force unless expressly 
superseded by a later agreement. (R. at 1873). While Acequia does indeed 
deal with the issue of the force and effect of two separate agreements 
between the disputing parties, unlike the present case, neither agreement 
includes the type of express merger/integration clause that the Final 
Agreement in this matter uses to memorialize the parties' accord. In fact, in 
this case, we have not just one, but several distinct clauses purporting to 
close the loop and rendering the Final Agreement just that, a final and 
complete agreement. (R. at 1692-1693). Likewise, Lincoln Elec. Co. v. St. 
Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. 210 F.3d 672 (6th Cir. 2000), relied on by the 
trial court, is inapposite to the present case for the same reasons. 
B. If the Final Agreement is unambiguous, as the trial court 
declares, its terms must be given effect and interpreted in 
accordance with their plain meaning and without resort to 
external, contradictory evidence. 
"If the contract is in writing and the language is not ambiguous, the 
intention of the parties must be determined from the words of the 
agreement." Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet 945 P.2d 180,190 (Utah 
17 
App. 1997); also Homer v. Smith. 866 P.2d 622, 629 (Utah App. 1993). 
Additionally, this Court has held, "If the language within the four corners 
of the contract is unambiguous a court determines the parties' intentions 
from the plain meaning of the contractual language as a matter of law." 
Panos at 820. 
In the present matter, the trial court cannot find the terms of the 
Final Agreement unambiguous on the one hand, but then simply disregard 
or situationally suspend those terms on the other without correction by this 
Court on review. The Defendants, in pursuit of summary disposition, 
advanced all manner of carefully selected extrinsic and parol evidence to 
urge the trial court to superimpose parts of the preliminary agreement on 
the Final Agreement in violation of multiple merger/integration clauses. 
The trial court should have resisted: "In interpreting unambiguous 
contracts, we do not consider a party's subjective intent, but rather assume 
its intent is accurately reflected in the plain meaning of the terms used. If 
the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the 
parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the 
contractual language" Tom Heal at 968 (emphasis added) (internal 
citations omitted). "[R]egardless of whether the parties may have had 
18 
preliminary agreements . . . we will assume that a writing dealing with the 
same subject was intended by the parties to supersede any prior or 
contemporaneous agreements." Novell Inc. v. Canopy Group, Inc., 92 
P.3d 768, 772 (Utah App. 2004) (citations omitted). 
If Mountain West indeed considered an indemnification provision 
like the one set out in the preliminary agreement fundamental to its interests 
in settling with Plaintiff, it had an affirmative obligation to either see that 
such a provision was negotiated for and incorporated into the Final 
Agreement, or at very least to see that the Final Agreement was not 
expressly and comprehensively integrated, as it clearly was in this case. (R. 
at 1692-1693). The parties to a contract "have a duty to make certain that 
their agreements have in fact been fully included in the final document." 
Panos at 819-820. This Court has found the failure to do so fatal to the type 
of relief sought by the Defendants: "[This] may seem harsh but serves the 
purpose of preserving the integrity of the final document and encouraging 
the diligence of the parties." Embassy Group, Inc. v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366, 
1370 (Utah App. 1993). 
As it stands, Defendants concede, as they must in order to qualify for 
summary disposition and to avoid the need for a jury determination, that the 
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language of the Final Agreement and the preliminary agreement is 
unambiguous. But they are then forced to prop up their position arguing for 
the parallel application of the preliminary agreement with the Final 
Agreement using all manner of extrinsic evidence in an effort to subtly 
undermine the merger and integration mechanisms of the Final Agreement. 
The plain language of the Final Agreement should be respected and 
the district court's summary judgment ruling overturned. 
II. ALTERNATIVELY, IF BOTH AGREEMENTS REMAIN 
VALID, AND IF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IS TO BE 
CONSIDERED, THEN IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE PARTIES 
INTENT WAS THAT THE SETTLEMENT NOT IMPEDE 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST McKAY-DEE HOSPITAL. 
In virtually identical fashion, the preliminary agreement and the 
Final Agreement both provide: 
Nothing in this Release shall be construed as releasing 
Ward's claims against. . . McKay Dee Hospital, and/or its 
employees. 
(R. at 1678). 
Yet Mountain West, by pursuing summary judgment below, has 
essentially sought to have the agreements judicially construed in such a 
fashion as to affect the release of Plaintiff s claims against McKay-Dee 
Hospital. Together with McKay-Dee, Mountain West advanced a theory on 
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summary judgment that relied on a disputed provision contained 
exclusively in the earlier of the two agreements. What the preliminary 
agreement could not do directly with respect to dispensing of this litigation, 
Defendants sought to do circuitously by using the preliminary agreement as 
a key character in a Parade of Horribles along with a secret indemnification 
agreement that the Defendants concluded amongst themselves. This 
theory, based on prospective interpretations of potential contractual 
disputes, gives rise to what they call "circular indemnification", which will 
be addressed infra. 
On the other hand, the context of the specific reservation of claims 
against McKay-Dee Hospital, which figures prominently in both 
memorializations of the settlement, suggests the substantial weight and 
importance the parties attached to that provision. Indeed, in adjudicating a 
similar motion earlier, the trial court declared: 
To me, it's absolutely clear when I read these two agreements 
that Mrs. Ward never intended - and any [sic] of the parties 
never intended to release McKay-Dee Hospital... it's very 
clear to me that this settlement was not designed to include 
the hospital. 
(R. at 1908: 44, 45). 
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Additionally, the attorney representing Plaintiff during the 
settlement negotiations provided deposition testimony that the 
merger/integration provisions were intended to be taken at face value, and 
that the overarching intent was that no aspect of the settlement with 
Mountain West was to interfere with Plaintiffs pursuit of remedies against 
McKay-Dee Hospital. (See R. at 1909: 51). The intent and understanding 
was to proceed against McKay-Dee Hospital without hindrance or 
interference from Mountain West, but Mountain West's current posture is 
clearly preventing that from happening in contravention of the settlement. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS TREATMENT OF A 
SECRET INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT CONCLUDED 
AMONGST THE DEFENDANTS AS A COMPONENT OF 
THEIR DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS. 
A. There is arguably no actual existing case or controversy that 
would justify the application of the theory of "circular 
litigation " since Mountain West's claim is entirely 
speculative at this point 
"[A] judgment can be rendered only in a real controversy between 
adverse parties." Salt Lake County v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384, 385 (Utah 
1996) (emphasis added). Thus, "courts will not issue advisory opinions or 
examine a controversy until such a clash actually occurs". Moab Citizens 
Alliance v. Grand County, 118 P.3d 879, 881-82 (Utah App. 2005) 
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(emphasis added); also State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 371 (Utah 1995); 
Boyle v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 866 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App.1993). 
In the present matter however, the trial court granted summary 
judgment in part reasoning that if the indemnification clause of the 
preliminary agreement survives the merger/integration clause of the Final 
Agreement, then there is a "chain of indemnity agreements [that] creates 
circular litigation." (R. at 1877). The trial court continues, "[I]n the event 
Mrs. Ward is awarded damages against McKay-Dee Hospital, McKay-Dee 
Hospital has a contractual right to indemnification from Mountain West, 
which has a contractual right to indemnification from Mrs. Ward." Id The 
trial Court then looks to Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42 (Utah 1989), 
to justify "dismissing a claim upon which no meaningful relief can be 
granted." (R. at 1877). 
The underlying problem, however, is that a determination that "no 
meaningful relief can be granted" because of ostensible "circular 
litigation," is contingent upon a prospective adjudication of facts and 
circumstances that have not and may never occur, and where no presently 
actionable controversy exists. The actual theory of "circular litigation" has 
apparently never been accepted by Utah courts, as the neither the trial court 
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nor the Defendants can reference any Utah case law accepting this premise. 
To grant summary judgment then, the trial court must simply make 
assumptions about whether and how prospective, as yet non-existent, future 
claims will arise and be resolved. This is reversible error. 
B. The trial court's grant of summary judgment is premised on 
a bald assumption regarding the force and validity of a 
contract between Mountain West and McKay-Dee. 
There is nothing in the record or in the trial court's final order to 
suggest that the court has ever even examined the indemnification 
agreement allegedly concluded between Mountain West and McKay-Dee to 
actually determine whether or not it would, in fact, be applicable to the 
facts and circumstances present in this matter and create a "circuity of 
litigation." It simply accepts, at face value, the self-serving representations 
of the Defendants regarding their alleged arrangement. 
The trial court apparently assumes that there are no viable contract 
defenses that would or could render their agreement inapplicable or 
unenforceable in this case. It makes no explicit findings evident in the 
record about that agreement, but still purports to rule as a matter of law that 
it is a legitimate link in an ostensible "indemnification chain" precluding 
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Plaintiff from pursuing a claim against McKay-Dee Hospital. This too is 
reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, this Court should overturn the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment and remand this case for trial on the 
merits. 
f« 
DATED this £$_ day of May, 2007. 
PRINCE YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Fonathon T. Tichy 
Bradley H. Parker 
James W. McConkie II 
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Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler 
RULING GRANTING MTN. 
WEST ANESTHESIA'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 010907610 
Judge Ernie W. Jones 
On November 13, 2006, the Court heard oral argument on a motion for summary 
judgment filed by Mountain West Anesthesia, LLC ("Mountain West") and joined in by 
IHC Health Services ("McKay-Dee Hospital"). After the hearing, the Court took the 
matter under advisement. Having now carefully considered the parties' memoranda and 
oral argument, the Court grants the motion. 
Ruling Granting Mountain West's Motion for Summaiy Judgment 
No. 010907610 
On July 18, 2000, Terry F. Ward was injured during an operation at McKay-Dee 
Hospital. Prior to filing any complaint, Plaintiff settled its claims against Mountain West 
and Dr. Luckwitz, the anesthesiologist for the operation. Mrs. Ward then filed the current 
complaint, raising claims against McKay-Dee Hospital and Dr. Carabine, the surgeon 
who performed the operation. Mrs. Ward's claims against both McKay-Dee Hospital and 
Dr. Carabine have since been dismissed. The Court then allowed Mrs. Ward to amend 
her complaint to include a claim against McKay-Dee Hospital under a theory of 
ostensible agency. This claim is one for vicarious liability based on Dr. Luckwitz's 
alleged negligence. This is the only cause of action remaining. 
While the underlying basis for liability in Mrs. Ward's cause of action is 
negligence, the controlling issues in this motion are issues of contract. Mrs. Ward settled 
with Mountain West and, in exchange for $1,000,000, executed a general release on 
March 16, 2001 ("release #1"). In this release, Mrs. Ward agreed to indemnify Mountain 
West for any future claims based on the alleged negligence of Dr. Luckwitz. On March 
29, 2001, Mrs. Ward executed another release ("release #2"). This release does not 
include an indemnification clause. This case pivots on the current legal effect of these 
two releases. The facts material to this determination are not in dispute, 
I. Release #1 is an Enforceable Agreement. 
Mrs. Ward claims that release #1 is not enforceable as it was signed by only Mrs. 
Ward and her counsel. A contract must be in writing and signed only if and to the extent 
required by the statute of frauds. A contract within the statute of frauds must be 
evidenced by a writing and signed by the party to be charged. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4. 
In this case, Mrs. Ward agreed to both release her claims against Mountain West and to 
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indemnify them for any subsequent payments based on Dr. Luckwitz's alleged 
negligence. Mrs. Ward, as the party to be charged under the indemnity agreement, signed 
as required by Utah Code Ami. § 25-5-4(1 )(b). The statute of frauds is satisfied. See 
Restatement (Second) Contracts § 135 (explaining that when a contract is within the 
statute of frauds and is signed by fewer than all of the parties "the contract is enforceable 
against the signers but not against the otheis). 
Mrs. Ward signed release #1 in exchange for Mountain West's agreement "to pay 
Ward the total sum of one million dollars ($1,000,000)." See Release #1 at § 1. Mrs. 
Ward acknowledged receipt of payment. Id. at §§ 1,2. Although Mountain West did not 
sign release #1, Mountain West had rendered performance. On March 16, 2001, the time 
of release #1, the parties exchanged performances in a legally binding contract. 
II. Release #2 Supplements Release #1. 
Mrs. Ward argues that release #2 rescinded or superceded release #1. Specifically 
Plaintiff cites "a time-honored maxim of contract law that a later agreement regarding a 
given subject matter supersedes an earlier agreement pertaining to those issues." 
Releases are contracts and the Court applies general contiact principles. Horgcm v. Indus. 
Design Corp , 657 P.2d 751, 753 (Utah 1982). 
Parties to any contract "may, by a new and later agreement, rescind it in whole or 
in part, alter or modify it in any respect, add to or supplement it, or replace it by a 
substitute." 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 500. The parties' intention regarding the effect 
of the later agreement on the prior agreement is controlling. Id. Generally, however, the 
original contract remains in force except as expressly superseded or contradicted by the 
later agreement. Id.; Acequia, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 226 F.3d 798 (7th Cir, 
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2000) (holding that when the examination of the language of the contracts along with 
their attendant circumstances reveal that the parties did not intend the new contract to 
supercede the prior contract, the prior contract remains in force insofar as it can be 
harmonized with the later contract); Lincoln Elec. Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. 
Co., 210 F.3d 672 (6th Cir. 2000) (same). 
In this case, the clear language of the two releases, along with the circumstances 
surrounding their making, show that the parties did not intend release #2 to either rescind 
or supercede release #1. Release #2 supplements release #1, providing for a structured 
armuity not addressed in release #1. Nowhere in release #2 is indemnity either waived or 
mentioned. The Court also notes the correspondence between Mr. Hardcastle, Mrs. 
Ward's previous lawyer, and counsel for defendants making arrangements to sign release 
#1. This correspondence discusses the need for "an additional release,5' one to which 
Mountain West would not be a party, to provide for the annuity between Mrs. Ward and 
the insurance company. Mrs. Ward's lawyer stated "[i]t is my understanding that we will 
also need to sign a Release with the annuity company to finalize this matter . . . If you 
have any questions or concerns regarding the language of either of these two releases, 
please feel free to contact me." See Mr. Hardcastle's March 13, 2001 Letter (emphasis 
added). Because release #2 neither supercedes release #1 nor contradicts release #Fs 
indemnity provision, the Court harmonizes the two releases. The Court finds that 
Mountain West and Mrs. Ward intended release #2 to supplement release #1, leaving 
release #Fs indemnity provisions intact. 
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III. The Reservation of Claims against McKay-Dee Hospital Does Not Affect 
Mountain West's Contractual Right to Indemnification. 
Mrs. Ward released all claims against Mountain West and Dr. Luckwitz. See 
Release #1 at § 2. Mrs. Ward did not release her claims against the other defendants. Id. 
The release states "[njolhing in this Release shall be construed as releasing Ward's 
claims against Dr. Steven J. Carabine, McKay Dee Hospital, and/or its employees." Id. 
Mrs. Ward seeks to recover damages from McKay Dee Hospital based on Dr. Luckwitz's 
alleged negligence. Mountain West is contractually obligated to indemnify McKay Dee 
Hospital for any damages its anesthesiologists cause—in this case, Dr. Luckwitz. 
Pursuant to this contract, McKay Dee filed a third party complaint against Mountain 
West for indemnification. Mountain West, in turn, claims that release #1 requires Mrs. 
Ward to indemnify it for any money Mountain West pays out to McKay Dee based on 
Dr. Luckwitz's alleged negligence. 
Mrs. Ward argues that the indemnification clause in release #1 should not apply in 
this case because the parties "intended that nothing in the settlement should in any way 
compromise or hinder Plaintiffs claim against McKay-Dee Hospital" See P.'s Opp. 
Memo at \ 5. The Court disagrees. The releases state that nothing in them "shall be 
construed as releasing" Mrs. Ward's claims against McKay Dee Hospital or Dr. 
Carabine. This is not a question of whether Mrs. Ward released her claims against 
McKay Dee Hospital or Dr. Carabine. Both releases expressly limited their own scope to 
exclude those claims. The Court has already ruled on this matter. However, limiting the 
scope of the release does not guarantee an unimpeded right to recover from McKay Dee 
Hospital or require either McKay Dee Hospital or Mountain West to lay down their 
contractual rights to indemnification. 
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When interpreting a contract, the Court tcmust first attempt to harmonize all of the 
contract's provisions and all of its terms when determining whether the plain language of 
the contract is ambiguous." Gilmor v. Macey, 121 P.3d 57, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) 
(quoting Wagner v. Clifton, 62 P.3d 440 (Utah 2002)). It is well-established "that a 
contract should be interpreted so as to harmonize all of its provisions and all of its terms, 
which terms should be given effect if it is possible to do so." LDS Hosp. v. Capitol Life 
Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988). In this case, the argument that the reservation 
of claims provision conflicts with and trumps the application of the indemnification 
provision fails, as both are easily harmonized. At the time the parties signed the releases, 
Mrs. Ward had potential claims against Dr. Carabine for his negligence and against 
McKay Dee for its own negligence. The releases did not release either claim. Mrs. Ward 
in fact brought these claims. Neither claim was based on vicarious liability for Dr. 
Luckwitz and neither, if successful, would have triggered the indemnification clause. 
Only after both claims were dismissed, did Mrs. Ward amend her complaint to claim that 
McKay Dee Hospital is vicariously liable for Dr. Luckwitz's alleged negligence. The 
fact that Mrs. Ward did not release McKay Dee Hospital in her settlement with Mountain 
West does not protect her from the application of Mountain West's contractual right to 
indemnification. 
"If the language within the four corners of the contract is unambiguous, the 
parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the contractual language, 
and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law." Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 
84 P.3d 1134, 1140 (Utah 2003). The Court has previously found the language of the 
releases unambiguous. Under the unambiguous language of release #1, the Court finds 
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that the paities intended that Mountain West would not be required to pay any subsequent 
amounts based on the incident of Dr. Luckwitz's alleged negligence. The Court finds no 
justification to eviscerate the hold harmless provision intended to give this intention 
effect. 
III. The Chain of Indemnity Agreements Creates Circular Litigation. 
Dismissing a claim upon which no meaningful relief can be granted is 
appropriate. See Bvrkell v. Schwendiman, 113 P.2d 42 (Utah 1989) (dismissing an appeal 
of a one year license suspension because the suspension had expired); Maryland Cas Co. 
v. Employers Mut Liab. Ins. Co., 208 F.2d 731 (2d. Cir. 1953) (dismissing claim against 
employer for the employee's negligence where settlement with employee created a 
"complete circuity of action"). The Court has already found that the indemnity 
agreement in release #1 is enforceable under its plain terms. Accordingly, in the event 
Mrs. Ward is awarded damages against McKay Dee Hospital, McKay Dee Hospital has a 
contractual right to indemnification from Mountain West, which has a contractual right to 
indemnification from Mrs. Ward. Mrs. Ward cannot obtain any further meaningful 
judicial relief. The Court, therefore, dismisses Mrs. Ward's claim against McKay Dee 
Hospital. Counsel for Mountain West will please prepare the appropriate order. 
Dated this ~Z~( day of November, 2006. 
\^r^-
Erme W. Jones, Judge 
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ATTACHMENT B 
RELEASE AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
This Release and Settlement Agreement ("Agreement") is made and entered into 
among Vickie L. Ward, individually and as permanent Guardian of Terry Faye Ward, an 
incapacitated adult and Conservator of the Estate of Terry Faye Ward, an incapacitated 
adult; Mountain West Anesthesia, LLC, John Luckwitz, M.D.; and Scottsdale Insurance 
Company ("the Parties"). \The "Claimant" shall collectively mean Vickie L Ward, 
individually and as permanent Guardian of Terry Faye Ward, an incapacitated adult and 
Conservator of the Estate of Terry Faye Ward, an incapacitated adult, their respective 
heirs, executors, administrators, personal representatives, successors and assigns; the 
"Insured" shall collectively mean Mountain West Anesthesia, LLC, and John Luckwitz, 
M.D.; and the "Insurance Company" shall mean Scottsdale Insurance Company. 
L RECITALS 
A. On or about July 18, 2000, at or near 3939 Harrison Boulevard, Ogden/Weber 
County, Utah, the Claimant claims that Terry Faye Ward .sustained physical injuries as a 
result of the alleged conduct of the Insured (the "Incident"). In connection -with "the 
Incident, the Claimant has asserted a claim against the insured based upon tort or tort 
type claims. 
B. The Insurance Company and the Insured have entered into a liability insurance 
contract which provides that the Insurance Company shall defend the Insured against any 
claim or suit for damages arising from the Incident, has authority to settle any such claim 
? or suit on behalf of and as agent for the Insured, and shall insure the Insured for such 
i 




IS C. The Parties desire to enter into this Agreement to provide, among other things, 
^ for considerations in full settlement and discharge of all claims and actions of the Claimant 
against the Insured for damages which allegedly arose out of or due to the Incident on the 
terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is agreed as follows: 
II. RELEASE 
A. Release and Discharge, In consideration of the cash payment(s) referred to in 
Paragraph III A and the promise to make the periodic payments referred to in Paragraph 
IILB. C'P^odic Payments"), the Claimant hereby completely releases and forever 
discharges the Insured, the Insurance Company, and any and all other persons, limns, or 
corporations from any and all past present or future claims, demands,-actions^damages, 
costs, expenses, loss of services, and causes of action of any kind or diaracter.^vhether 
based on tort, contract, or other theory of recovery, whether known or unknown, including 
any and all claims for loss of marital services and consortium, which have arisen in the 
past or which may arise in the future, whether directly or indirectly, caused by, connected 
with or resulting from the Incident This release and discharge shall be a fully binding and 
complete settlement among all Parties to this Agreement and their heirs, assigns, and 
2 
S successors. Nothing in this Release and the attached Uniform Qualified Assignment and 
la 
$ Release shall be construed as releasing Claimant's claims against Dr. Steven J, Carabine 
» * 
n
 and/or McKay Dee Hospital and it's employees. 
si The Claimant acknowledges and agrees that this release and discharge is a 
general release. The Claimant expressly waives and assumes the risk of any and all 
claims for damages and expenses against the Insured, which exist as of this date, but of 
which the Claimant does nbt know or suspect to exist, whether through ignorance, 
oversight, error, negligence, or otherwise, and which, if known, would materially affect the 
Claimants decision to enter into this Agreement The Claimant further agrees that the 
Claimant has accepted the considerations set forth in Paragraphs III A, and B. as a 
complete compromise of matters involving disputed issues of law and fact The Claimant 
assumes the risk that the facts or law may be other than the Claimant believes. It is 
understood and agreed to by the Parties that this settlement is a compromise of a doubtful 
and disputed claim, and the payments are not to be construed as an admission of liability 
on the part of the Insured, by whom liability is expressly denied. 
B. Injuries Known and Unknown, The Claimant fully understands7 that the 
Claimant may have suffered personal injuries that are unknown to the Claimant at present 
and that unknown complications of present known injuries may arise, develop or be 
discovered in the future, including, but not limited to, subsequent death or disability. The 
Claimant acknowledges that the consideration received under this Agreement is intended 
to and does release and discharge the Insured and the Insurance Company from any 
3 
C claims for, or consequences arising from, the injuries which allegedly arose from the 
$ Incident; and the Claimant hereby waives any rights to assert in the future any claims not 
n 
* now known or suspected even though, if such claims were known, such knowledge would 
I ^
 materially affect the terms of this Agreement. 
2 
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C. Parties Released. This release and discharge shall also apply to the Insured's 
and the Insurance Company's past, present, and future officers, directors, stockholders, 
attorneys, agents, servants, representatives, employees, subsidiaries, affiliates, reinsurers, 
partners, predecessors and successors in interest, heirs, executors, personal 
representatives, and assigns and all other persons, firms or corporations with whom any of 
t ie former have been, are now, or may hereafter be affiliated. 
HI. PAYMENTS TO CLAIMANT. PAYEE, AND/OR BENEFICIARY 
A. Payment at Settlement (and Amounts Previously Paid). The Insurance 
Company and the Insured have paid Three Hundred Ninety Three Thousand Three 
Hundred Thirty Three Dollars ($393,333) to the Claimant, and Claimant's counsel, jUqyd 
Hardcastle, receipt of which is acknowledged. This includes, but is not limited tdf all put; of 
pocket expenses, attorney fees, all medical liens, all rights of recovery, all medical 
subrogation claims, all worker compensation subrogation claims, known and unknown, 
and claims for general damages. 
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B. Periodic Payments. The Insurance Company, on behalf of the Insured, agrees 
to pay or cause to be paid the following Periodic Payments: 
(1) To Vickie L Ward, Trustee of the Terry F. Wand Trust ("Payee"), the sum of Two 
Thousand Seven Hundred Two Dollars ($2,702) to be paid on or about the 
twenty ninth (29th) day of each month beginning on or about April 29, 2001, and 
continuing for the life of Terry Faye Ward, The aforesaid payments are 
guaranteed to be pvaid for a period of two hundred sixty five (265) months, with 
the last guaranteed payment to be made on or about April 29,2023. 
(2) Should Terry Faye Wand die before April 29, 2023, then any remaining 
guaranteed Periodic Payments set forth in Subparagraph ULB.(1) shall instead 
be paid, subject to the provisions of Subparagraph lll.B.(5) below, as they 
become due, to Vickie L Ward ("Beneficiary*), with the last guaranteed 
Periodic Payment to be made on or about April 29, 2023. Should Vickie L 
Ward die before the remaining guaranteed Periodic Payments are made as set 
forth in Subparagraph lll.B.(1)f then all remaining guaranteed Periodic 
Payments "will be made subject to the provisions of Subparagraph :1ILBX5) 
below, as they come due, to the duly appointed Successor Taistee of the Terry 
Faye Ward Trust with the last payment to be on or about April 29, 2023. 
Should Terry Faye Ward die after April 29, 2023, then monthly payments as 




(3) To the Trustee of the Vickie L Ward Trust ("Payee"), the sum of One Thousand 
Five Hundred Eighty Seven Dollars ($1,587) to be paid on or about the first 
(1^) day of each month, beginning on or about May 1, 2001, guaranteed to be 
paid for a period of one hundred eighty (180) months, with the last guaranteed 
payment to be made on or about April 1,2016, 
(4) Should Vickie L Ward die before April 1,2016, then any remaining guaranteed 
Periodic Payments sent forth in Subparagraph HLB-(3), shall instead be paid, 
subject to the provisions of Subparagraph UIB,(5) below, as they become due, 
to the duly appointed Successor Trustee of the Vicky L Ward Trust, with the 
last payment to be made on or about April 1,2016. 
(5) Each Payee shall have the right to submit a request to diange the Benefidary by 
filing a written request with the owner of the Annuity Contract The^change witt 
be effective when approved by both the owner of the Annuity Contract and the 
Annuity Issuer. Any change in the Beneficiary shall not ki any way affect or after 
any of the provisions of this Agreement 
IV. ASSIGNMENT AND FUNDING OF PERIODIC PAYMENT OBUGATIQN 
A Assignment of Obligation The Parties understand ..and agree that.the 
Insurance Company may assign Its duties and obligations to make such future Periodic 
Payments to GECapMAs^gnmentCorporatkm CAssignee") pursuant to a "Qualified 
Assignment and Release," within the meaning of Section 130(c) of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986, as amended, attached as Exhibit A. Such assignment is accepted by the 
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Ijjj. Claimant without right of rejection and in full discharge and release of the duties and 
g obligations of the Insurance Company and all Parties released by this Agreement with 
M 
0 
# respect to such Periodic Payments. Upon such assignment it is understood and agreed 
s by and between the Parties that the Assignee shall make said Periodic Payments directly 
s 
3 to the respective Payee and/or Beneficiary designated in Subparagraphs III.B.(1) and (2), 
and that the Payee shall submit any request to change the Beneficiary directly to the 
Assignee. 
THE PARTIES EXPRESSLY UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT, WITH THE 
INSURANCE COMPANYS ASSIGNMENT OF THE DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS TO 
MAKE SUCH PERIODIC PAYMENTS TO GE CAPITAL ASSIGNMENT CORPORATION 
PURSUANT TO THIS AGREEMENT, ALL OF THE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
OTHERWISE IMPOSED UPON THE INSURANCE COMPANY BY THIS AGREEMENT 
WITH RESPECT TO SUCH PERIODIC PAYMENTS SHALL CEASE, AND INSTEAD 
SUCH OBLIGATION SHALL BE BINDING SOLELY UPON GE CAPITAL ASSIGNMENT 
CORPORATION. THE PARTIES FURTHER UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT WHEN 
THE ASSIGNMENT IS MADE THE INSURANCE COMPANY SHALL BE RELEASED 
FROM ALL OBLIGATIONS TO MAKE SUCH PERIODIC PAYMENTS AND 
GE CAPITAL ASSIGNMENT CORPORATION SHALL AT ALL TIMES BE DIRECTLY 
AND SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR, AND SHALL RECEIVE CREDIT FOR, THE 
PERIODIC PAYMENTS, AND THAT WHEN THE ASSIGNMENT IS MADE, GE CAPITAL 
ASSIGNMENT CORPORATION ASSUMES THE DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF 
THE INSURANCE COMPANY WITH RESPECT TO SUCH PERIODIC PAYMENTS. 
7 
j$ B. Annuity Funding. The Parties understand and agree that the Assignee may 
k0 
ej fund its obligation to make the Periodic Payments by purchasing an annuity contract (the 
J* Annuity Contract") from GE Capital Assurance Company (the "Annuity Issuer"). If such 
\ Annuity Contract is purchased, the Assignee shall be the owner of the Annuity Contract 
S and shall have and retain all rights of ownership in the Annuity Contract 
For its own convenience, the Assignee may direct the Annuity Issuer to make all the 
Periodic Payments directly td the respective Payees and/or Beneficiaries designated in 
Paragraph lll.B. Each Payee and Beneficiary designated in Paragraph I1U3. shall be 
responsible for maintaining his/her current mailing address with the Annuity Issuer. 
The obligation assumed by the Assignee to make each Periodic Payment shall be 
fully discharged upon the mailing of a valid check or electronic funds transfer in the 
amount of such payment on or before the due date to the last address on record for the 
Payee or Beneficiary with the Annuity Issuer. If the Payee or Beneficiary notifies the 
Assignee that any check or electronic funds transfer was not received, the Assignee shall 
direct the Annuity Issuer to initiate a stop payment action and, upon confirmation that such 
check was not previously negotiated or electronic funds transfer deposited, shall have the 
Annuity Issuer process a replacement payment 
C. Status of Claimant Payees, and Beneficiaries, The Claimant, each Payee 
and each Beneficiary, as applicable, shall at all times remain a general creditor of the 
Assignee and shall have no rights in the Annuity Contract nor in any other assets of the 
Assignee. The Assignee shall not be required to set aside sufficient assets or secure its 
obligation to the Claimant, each Payee, or each Beneficiary, in any manner whatsoever. 
8 
I ' D. Date of Birth. The Claimant, Vickie L Ward, warrants and represents that 
«* 
S Terry Faye Ward was born on April 29,1958, Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in 
w 
| this Agreement, if the actual date of birth is not as stated above, and if the Insurance I 
£ Company or the Assignee relies or has relied on the accuracy of the above-stated date of s 
« birth in determining the amount, timing and/or duration of the Periodic Payments or the 
cost of providing them, the Insurance Company or the Assignee may take such actions as 
are necessary to reflect the correct date of birth. These actions include but are not limited 
to: 1) adjusting the amount timing and/or duration of the remaining Periodic Payments so 
that the Insurance Company or Assignee incurs no additional cost beyond that necessary 
to purchase the Annuity Contract on the date of assignment to provide the Periodic 
Payments based on the correct date of birth or 2) recovering from the Claimant, Payee, or 
Beneficiary, as appropriate, any Periodic Payments already paid in excess of the Periodic 
Payments that could have been provided by an Annuity Contract purchased on the date of 
assignment based on the correct date of birth. 
V. NO CHANGES IN PERIODIC PAYMENTS 
The Claimant acknowledges and agrees that all, some, or any part of the Periodic 
Payments cannot be accelerated, commuted, transferred, deferred, increased or 
decreased by the Claimant or by any Payee or Beneficiary and that the Claimant or any 
Payee or Beneficiary shall not have the power to sell, mortgage, encumber, or otherwise 
anticipate all, some, or any part of the Periodic Payments by assignment or otherwise. 
9 
a 
VL ENTIRE AGREEMENT 
This Agreement contains the entire agreement between the Claimant the Insured, 
and the Insurance Company with regard to the matters set forth in it. There are no other 
understandings or agreements, verbal or otherwise, in relation to the Agreement between 
the Parties except as expressly set forth in it. 
This Agreement is intended to conform with the requirements of Internal Revenue 
Code Sections 104(a)(2) and 130. All provisions of this Agreement should be construed in 
a manner so as to effectuate that intent 
VIL READING OF AGREEMENT 
In entering into this Agreement, the Claimant represents that the Claimant has 
completely read all of its terms and that such terms are fully understood and voluntarily 
accepted bv the Claimant The Claimant has been represented by counsel of the 
Claimants choice. 
VtIL FUTURE COOPERATION 
All Parties agree to cooperate fully, to execute any and all supplementary 
documents, and to take all additional actions that may be necessary or appropriate to give 
10 
1692 
S full force and effect to the terms and intent of this Agreement which are not inconsistent 
t * 
« with its terms. 
M 
3 ,x« DRAFTING OF DOCUMENT AND RELIANCE BY CLAIMANT 
s 
This Agreement has been negotiated by the respective Parties through counsel The 
Parties to this Agreement contemplate and intend that all payments set forth in Section 111 
constitute damages received on account of personal injuries or sickness, arising from the 
Incident, within the meaning of Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as 
amended. However, the Claimant warrants, represents, and agrees that the Claimant is 
not relying on the advice of the Insured, the Insurance Company, anyone associated with 
them, induding their attorneys and the insurance broker placing the Annuity Contract, as 
to the legal and income tax or other consequences of any kind arising out of this 
Agreement Accordingly, the Claimant hereby releases and holds harmless the Insured, 
the Insurance Company, and any and all counsel or consultants for the Insured and the 
Insurance Company from any claim, cause of action, or other rights of any kind which the 
Claimant may assert because the legal, income tax or other consequences of this 
Agreement are other than those anticipated by the Claimant 
The Parties signing this Agreement, and each of them, warrant and represent that no 
promise, inducement or agreement not expressed in this Agreement has been made to 
them and that this Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the Parties and 
that the terms of this Agreement are contractual and not mere recitals 
11 
3 The Claimant represents and agrees that the Claimant has read the Agreement and 
% fully understands it, and has been advised by counsel of the Claimant's own choosing as 
| to the propriety and legal effect of executing it, and neither the Agreement nor the 
* compromise and settlement recited in it were induced by fraud, coercion, compulsion or 
S 
w
 mistake, nor is this Agreement nor the compromise and settlement made in reliance upon 
any statement or representation of any of the Parties released by this Agreement or their 
representatives, agents or attorneys. 
X. WARRANTY OF CAPACITY TO EXECUTE AGREEMENT 
The Claimant represents and warrants that, with the exception of contingency fee 
contracts and any agreements which may exist between the Claimant and Claimant's 
counsel relative to the reimbursement of litigation expenses, no other person or entity has, 
or has had, any interest in the claims, demands, obligations, or causes of action referred to 
in this Agreement, and that the Claimant has the sole right and exclusive authority to 
execute this Agreement and receive the sums specified in it and that the Claimant has not 
sold, assigned, transferred, conveyed or otherwise disposed of any of the claims, 
demands, obligations or causes of action referred to in this Agreement. 
XI. COURT APPROVAL 
The Parties agree that the Claimant will file petitions for all necessary court 
approvals, that all such petitions and orders shall be in a form satisfactory to all Parties, 





XII- CONTROLLING LAW 
This Agreement shall be construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of 
the State of Utah. 
Dated: 3-33-01 /,LrbubH!.(jJOUi£L 
Dated • A 3\QI 
Vickie L Wand, individually and as permanent Guardian 
of Terry Faye Ward, an incapacitated adult and as 
Conservator of the Estate of Terry Faye Ward, an 
incapacitated adult, Claimant 
V^U^tACS^ Cib+J^tS 
Duly Authorized Representative for Scottsdale 
Insurance Company 
Approved as to Form and Content 
Dated: 
loyd Hal , Counsel for Claimant 
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ATTACHMENT C 
» SP-TTLKMKiNT AGREEMENT AND GENERAL RELEASE 
0* 
| V1CKIB LYNN WARD, individually and as permanent guardian of TERRY FAY1Z 
1 WARD, an incapacitated adult, and as conservator of the ESTATlf OF TERRY 1< AYE WARD, 
® an incapacitated adult (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Ward") and MOUNTAIN WEST 
S ANHSTUESIA, LLC, all of its associated physicians including JOHN LUCKWITZ, MJX, and 
3 SCCHTSD ALE INSURANCE COMPANY (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Insured"), 
ami their respective heirs, executors, administrators, personal representatives, successors, agents, 
employees, indemnitors and assigns, enter into this Settlement Agreement and General Release 
(hcreinafler referred to as "Settlement Agreement"), for the consideration hereinafter set forth 
ilus JA^Y of March, 2001. 
1. Settlement Payments. 
Concurrently with the execution of this Settlement Agreement, Insured agrees to pay 
Ward the lotnl sum of one million dollars ($1,000,000), receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged, 
2. Release of All Claims. 
In consideration of the payment referred to above, the receipt and sufficiency of which is 
hereby acknowledged, Ward, for and on behalf of her heirs, administrators, successors and 
assigns, hereby releases, acquits and forever discharges Insured and their past, present and future 
officers, directors, stockholders, attorneys, agents, physicians, servants, representatives, 
employees, subsidiaries, affiliates, partners, insureds, predecessors and successors in interest, and 
all other persons or entities, for whose conduct they may be liable, of and from any and all 
claims, demands, damages, causes of action, suits and liabilities, which Ward now has or which 
way hereafter accrue, because of, arising out of or in any way connected with any act or omission 
committed prior to the date of this Settlement Agreement, including specifically, but without 
limitation, lo medical caro and treatment (or the alleged lack thereof) rendcrcd prior io the date of 
this Settlement Agreement, which medical care and treatment is alleged to have caused injury, 
damage, and loss to Ward on or about July 18,2000, at or near 3939 Harrison Boulevard, Ogdcn. 
Vcbci County, Utah, arising out of surgery and care at McKay Dec Hospital. Nothing in this 
Release shall be construed as releasing Ward's claims against Dr. Steven J. Carabine, McKay 
f)ee Hospital, and/or its employees. 
Ward understands and agrees that the sum paid, as specified in this Settlement 
Agreement, constitutes full and complete satisfaction of all claims she now has or which may 
hereafter accrue against Insured, and ail other persons or entities for whose conduct Insured may 
bo liable by reason of acts and omissions committed prior to the date of tins Settlement 
Agreement and that this is a document of release of ail claims including, but not limited to, 
claims fun pain and .suffering; personal injury, death, permanent disability; bodily impairment; 
§ Ward Release 
$ March 2000 
O Tagc 2 
VI 
S neurological injury and damage; loss of cognitive abilities, loss of bodily function and function 
% of organs, glands, structures, tissues and muscles; loss of consortium; psychological or emotional 
* damage, distress or anxiety; loss or impairment of earning capacity* loss of wages and salary and 
H all oilier employment and income losses of every kind and character; hospital, surgical, medical, 
«< nursing and drug expenses and ail other expenses arising from bodily injury or impairment; 
punitive damages; attorney fees and legal costs; and claims of every other kind and character 
against Insured and all oilier persons or entities for whose conduct they may be liable arising 
from "or relating to acts and omissions committed prior to the date of tills Settlement Agreement 
3, General .Release. 
Ward hereby acknowledges and agrees that the release of claims against Insured is a 
general rolcusc, iind she further expressly waives and assumes the risk of any and all claims for 
damages against Insured which exist as of this date, but which Ward does not know of or suspect 
to exist, whether through ignorance, oversight, error, negligence, or otherwise, and which, if 
known, would materially affect her decision to enter into this Settlement Agreement, Ward 
further agrees to accept payment of the sum specified in this Settlement Agreement as a complete 
compromise of matters involving disputed issues of law and fact and she fully assumes the risk 
that the facts or law may be otherwise than she believes. 
4« Warranty of Capacity to Execute Agreement 
Ward represents nnd warrants that no other person or entity has or has had any interest in 
the claims, demands, obligations or causes of action referred to in this Settlement Agreement; 
that she has the sole right and exclusive authority to execute this Settlement Agreement and 
receive the sum specified in it; and that she has not sold, assigned, transferred, conveyed or 
otherwise disposed of any of the claims, demands, obligations or causes of action referred to in 
tins Settlement Agreement Ward warrants that she has received no notice of any subrogation 
claims against the amounts to be paid pursuant to this Settlement Agreement and further warrants 
that she has received no Medicaid assistance for which reimbursement may be owed pursuant to 
live Medical Hcuufits Recovery Act, U.C.A, § 26-19-1, et seq. 
5. Disclaimer of Liability, 
Ward acknowledges and agrees that she accepts payment of the sum specified in this 
Settlement Agreement as a full and complete compromise of matters involving disputed issues; 
Hut neither payment of the sum specified herein nor the negotiation for this settlement shall be 
§ Wan! Release 
f? March 2000 
$ JMKc3 
«* 
eonsliucd as admissions of the Insured; that no past or present wrongdoing on the part of Insured 
shall bo implied by such payment or negotiation, 
6, KlUiro At>rc?cmentand Successors in Interest. 
Ward acknowledges and agrees that this Setdcnicnt Agreement contains the entire 
agreement between herself and Insured with regard (o the matters set forth in this Settlement 
Agreement and that this Settlement Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of 
the executors, administrator?, personal representatives, heirs, indemnitors, successors, officers, 
directors} employees and assigns of each, 
?• Indemnification. 
As consideration for (ho payment described in paragraph 1 of the Settlement Agreement, 
Ward agrees to indemnify Insured from all claims of Ward or others arising from or in any way 
connected with the actual or alleged acts or omissions of Insured occurring prior to the date 
hereof Ward also agrees <o satisfy all legal rights for contribution, subrogation and indemnity 
and to hold the Insured harmless from all such claims., including but not limited to such claims of 
public or private health insurance companies or state or federal agencies. 
8« Confidentiality. 
Insured and Wan! agree that neither they nor their attorneys or representatives shall reveal 
to anyone, other than to Ward's financial advisors, or as may be mutually agreed to in writing or 
by order of a court of competent jurisdiction, any of the terms of this Settlement Agreement, or 
any of the amounts, numbers, terms, or conditions of any sums payable to Ward as sot forth, 
9, f\cprCsScnin(ion of Comprehension of Document. 
In entering into Urn Settlement Agreement, Ward represents that she has relied upon the 
legal advice of her attorney, who is the attorney of her choice, that the terms of this Settlement 
Agrccmcnt liavc been completely read and explained to her by her attorney and that she fully 
understands and voluntarily accepts them, 
10« Court Approval 
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